A Framework for Thinking About
Options for Restructuring Alaska Salmon Fisheries

prepared by

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Why Are We Talking About Restructuring Alaska Salmon Fisheries?

“Restructuring” may be defined as any change in the rules affecting how, where, when and by whom salmon are harvested in Alaska.

Why are we talking about restructuring? The Alaska salmon industry is facing severe economic challenges. One way to address these challenges may be to restructure salmon fisheries in order to lower costs, increase value, make management more sustainable, and/or to achieve social goals such as directing a greater share of the benefit from the fisheries to Alaska communities.

Restructuring is not the only strategy for addressing the challenges facing the salmon industry. There are many other strategies as well, such as:

- Reduce costs by improving transportation infrastructure
- Raise value by establishing quality standards
- Raise value with more and better marketing

This workshop is focusing specifically on restructuring because it is a big and complicated topic and we can’t successfully talk about all potential strategies at the same time. In addition, the effectiveness of other strategies may be linked to restructuring.

The goal of this workshop is not to advocate restructuring, but rather to understand what kinds of options there may be for restructuring and how they might work.

Possible Reasons for Restructuring

Potential problems with our current salmon management system which might be addressed by restructuring include the following:

- **Costs may be higher than necessary.** More boats and gear are fishing than are needed to catch the available fish. People keep upgrading gear to try to catch a larger share (so total costs keep rising even though we’re not catching any more fish)

- **Value may lower than it could be.** The race for fish may lower quality because fishermen don’t have time to handle fish carefully. We may not be using the best kind of gear for producing high quality fish. The timing of harvests and deliveries may not be optimal for maintaining quality and meeting market demands. We may not be marketing fish as effectively as possible because harvesters and processors don’t know how many fish they will have

- **We may not be achieving our social goals.** Local residents may not be benefiting from our fisheries as locally-owned permits are sold. Permit costs may make it difficult for young people to participate in profitable fisheries.
Restructuring may help to reduce costs by reducing the number of boats fishing and the amount of gear they fish. Restructuring may help increase value by improving the quality of harvested fish and the timing of when they are delivered, and by facilitating more effective marketing.

But costs and value aren’t all that matter in thinking about restructuring. There are many other important issues to consider in thinking about restructuring options and their potential effects:

- Constitutional constraints on management options
- Resource sustainability and management costs
- Distribution of benefits of restructuring among fishermen
- Employment of fishermen and crew
- Effects on processors and tenders
- Effects on communities
- Philosophical issues of who should benefit from our salmon resources and what is “fair”
- Internal fishing industry politics
- State and federal politics

**The Fundamental Choice in Restructuring:**

Our current management system is competitive. A limited entry permit gives you an opportunity to fish. You are competing with other permit holders for the available fish. How much fish you catch depends on how effectively you compete.

There are advantages to a competitive management system:

- Fishermen are used to a competitive system
- Managers are used to a competitive system
- Processors are used to a competitive system
- Fishermen enjoy competing
- Competing for fish allows the hardest working fishermen to get ahead
- Competition is “the American way”

But there are also disadvantages to a competitive management system:

- Racing for fish tends to increase costs
- Racing for fish tends to lower value
- If a fishery is profitable, fishermen tend to keep investing more and more in boats and gear to try to catch a larger share—which increases costs without increasing value. (Economists call this “capital stuffing.”) So over time a competitive fishery becomes less and less profitable.
- It’s difficult to innovate, because everyone has to use the same gear in order to make the competition for fish fair.
The fundamental choice in restructuring is whether to keep a competitive management system or change to an allocation-based management system.

Keeping a competitive management system would be much easier. The changes would be far less drastic. It would still be possible to achieve significant economic benefits. Keeping a competitive system would raise far fewer political and constitutional issues. But the opportunities to lower costs and increase value would be far higher with a competitive system than with an allocation-based system.

A Typology of Restructuring Options

As we think about restructuring, it is useful to classify restructuring proposals into four broad groups resulting in the following kinds of management systems:

A. Competitive system with the same number of permits
B. Competitive system with fewer permits
C. Allocation-based system with the same gear
D. Allocation-based system with different gear

Progressing from the beginning to the end of this list, the magnitude of the change increases, the difficulty of restructuring increases, and the social disruption likely to result from restructuring increases. But so does the potential economic benefit from restructuring as a result of lower costs and higher value.

A. Options Keeping a Competitive System with the Same Number of Permits

There are a number of ways to in which costs could be reduced while keeping the number of salmon permits the same, by changing the rules for how permits may be fished or what a permit entitles the permit holder to do. Below are two examples:

**Divide Permit Holders into Groups**
CONCEPT: Divide permit holders into groups. Allow different groups to fish different openings, balancing openings so that groups have equal opportunities.
RATIONALE: Allows savings on fuel because each boat fishes fewer openings (but theoretically can catch the same number of fish because fewer other boats are fishing).
ISSUES: Hard for managers to balance fishing opportunities fairly between openings. Permit holders and crew waste time while sitting around waiting to fish.

**Permit Stacking**
CONCEPT: Allow permit holders to combine operations, with gear proportional to the number of permits.
RATIONALE: Allows savings because fewer boats fish the same amount of gear
VARIATIONS: Reduce amount of gear for permit holders who fish alone, providing an incentive for permit holders to combine operations and reducing total costs because less gear is fished.
ISSUES: Hard on people who don’t want to fish together.
B. Options Keeping a Competitive System with Fewer Permits

Costs could be reduced while keeping a competitive fishery by reducing the number of permits fished. This could be done by “buying out” or “retiring” permits. There are numerous issues in how to go about reducing the number of permits. The table below briefly summarizes some of the key design issues. It is important to think very carefully about these issues, because the effects of permit reductions will depend to a very large extent on how the permit reduction is carried out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Issue</th>
<th>Some Potential Answers</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the change in the number of permits temporary or permanent?</td>
<td>Temporary: Permits may be “bought out” from fishing on an annual basis</td>
<td>Temporary buyouts may be more complicated to administer but offer greater flexibility in response to changes in harvest projections and market conditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do we remove permits from the fishery?</td>
<td>Buybacks--Pay permit holders to give up their permits; Retire permits as people default on loans; Ban permit transfers and retire permits which aren't fished</td>
<td>Buybacks cost more, but allow for a quicker adjustment to a different number of permits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who pays for permit buybacks?</td>
<td>Federal government; State government; The remaining permit holders; Federal or state loans paid back by remaining permit holders</td>
<td>The more they can get someone else to pay for a buyback program, the more the remaining permit holders will benefit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which permits get bought out, and for how much?</td>
<td>We offer a fixed price for permits and buy all permits offered for sale at that price; We accept closed bids for permits and buy back those permit holders who are willing to sell for the lowest price; We offer people different prices based on their recent catch history; The buyout program has a right of first refusal on all permit sales and permits are bought out as permit holders retire.</td>
<td>If the buyout is voluntary, then what we offer to pay will affect how many permits get bought out. The less we are willing to pay for a buyout, the less capacity (in terms of ability to catch fish) we will remove from the fishery. Buying out permits which aren't being fished won't have any short-term benefit (but may provide benefits if economic conditions improve or we also restructure the fishery in other ways).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do we target certain kinds of permits for buyouts based on social goals?</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Targeted buyouts may help to keep permits locally owned--but would reduce the options of local permit holders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>If the remaining permit holders pay for a buyback, who pays how much?</td>
<td>All remaining permit holders pay the same amount; The payment each year is proportional to catch value</td>
<td>How much the remaining permit holders benefit from a buyback depends partly on how much they catch but also on how much the value of their permit increases. It may be difficult to design a payment system that charges the remaining permit holders in proportion to how much they benefit.</td>
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C. Options Involving an Allocation-Based System With the Same Gear

In an allocation-based system, shares of some or all of the entire harvest are allocated to groups or individuals. Examples of such systems are harvester coops (such as the Chignik Salmon Cooperative), IFQs and CDQs.

The rationale for allocation-based systems is that because harvesters are no longer competing for fish, they can instead focus on saving costs by catching fish efficiently, and increasing value by handling fish more carefully and delivering in volumes and at times to better meet market demands.

As with restructuring options based on permit reductions, there are numerous issues in the design of restructuring options based on allocations. The table on the following two pages briefly summarizes some of these key design issues. It is important to think very carefully about these issues, because the effects of allocation-based systems will depend critically on how they are set up.

The Latent Permit Problem

Unfished or “latent” permits represent a significant challenge to restructuring Alaska salmon fisheries. At present, those permit holders who are not fishing are getting no value from the harvest. Any kind of restructuring which increases the potential value from participating in the fishery will tend to draw some of these permits back into the fishery, either as active harvesters or to share in the potential benefits of buybacks, coops or other allocation-based schemes. To the extent that this happens, the potential benefits to those permit holders who are presently participating in the fishery will tend to be diluted. This will likely represent a significant challenge to achieving consensus about restructuring.

Conclusions

Restructuring of Alaska salmon fisheries will be a very complex task. Any significant changes to how we manage our salmon fisheries may have far-reaching implications which will occur over many years.

There are many different ways to go about restructuring, and many fundamental choices in how to design permit reduction or allocation-based restructuring schemes, which profoundly affect the kinds of effects restructuring may have and who is likely to benefit from restructuring.

Many kinds of restructuring decisions are difficult to reverse. It is important to think very carefully about the effects of different restructuring options and how they are designed.
## Restructuring Options Based on Allocations: Key Design Issues

<table>
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<td>How much of the fishery is allocated?</td>
<td>Less than 100%--part of the fishery remains competitive; 100% is allocated</td>
<td>Restructuring may be easier if participation in the allocation-based fishery is optional and permit holders can continue to fish competitively if they wish to. But having two systems may make it more difficult to manage the fishery, and it may be difficult to design a system which is fair to permit holders in both fisheries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who makes the allocations based on what criteria?</td>
<td>Board of Fisheries based on criteria which they determine and which may vary from fishery to fishery; Board of Fisheries based on standard criteria specified by the Legislature; Legislature defines a process for making allocations independent of the Board of Fisheries</td>
<td>The more flexibility in how allocations are made, the greater the opportunity to respond to different regional circumstances, but the more complex and political the process of restructuring and making allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are allocations to groups or individuals?</td>
<td>One group only; Two or more groups; Individuals who must fish in groups of a minimum size; Individuals who may fish individually or in groups</td>
<td>The smaller the number of allocations, the easier it is for managers to achieve and enforce allocation targets, but the harder it is to form and administer groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who receives the allocations?</td>
<td>Permit holders, based on equal shares; Permit holders, based on catch history; Communities; Auctioned to the highest bidder (like oil leases or timber sales); Permit holders receive allocations based on equal shares or catch history for a limited period of time, with a transition to allocations based on another method such as to communities or by auction</td>
<td>Who receives the allocations, and how much (if anything) they pay for them is critically important in determining who will benefit from the restructuring and the fishery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do groups or individuals pay for allocations?</td>
<td>Allocations are given away for free; Allocation holders pay a tax or royalty in return for allocations; Allocations are auctioned to the highest bidder (like oil leases or timber sales); Communities sell allocations (like CDQ groups)</td>
<td>The more allocation-based restructuring benefits a fishery by increasing its profitability, and the greater the extent to which it reduces the number of people actually participating in the fishery, the greater the extent to which other Alaskans are likely to demand a share in the profits.</td>
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*Note: Table continues on next page.*
## Restructuring Options Based on Allocations: Key Design Issues (continued)

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<tr>
<th>What is the time period of the allocation?</th>
<th>Annual—varies from year to year depending on the number of permit holders who join a group or some other criterion</th>
<th>Annual allocations offer greater flexibility and are easier to reverse, but offer less certainty for investment in gear and marketing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If allocations are permanent, are they transferable?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Transferable allocations offer greater potential for efficiency, but also offer the potential for large windfall gains if received for free, and higher costs for new entrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>If allocations are to a group of permit holders, how are profits shared within the group?</td>
<td>Must be equal for all permit holders</td>
<td>How profits are shared is critically important to who benefits from allocation-based management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If allocations are fished by groups, who does the fishing?</td>
<td>Selection of boats based on which boats can fish for the lowest cost</td>
<td>Those boats which can fish for the lowest cost may not be local boats employing local people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If allocations are fished by groups, how are those boats which fish paid?</td>
<td>Based on pounds caught</td>
<td>If boats are paid based on pounds caught, they may continue to race for fish, resulting in higher costs. If boats are paid based on time fished, they may not work as hard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If allocations are to a group, what requirements are placed on permit holders who are in the group?</td>
<td>Required to participate in the fishery</td>
<td>The more restrictions, the lower the potential efficiency gains, but the less protection for other fisheries from sideboard effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What restrictions are placed on groups receiving allocations as to where they sell fish?</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Allocations to harvesters significantly increase their market power and options. The fewer restrictions, the greater the potential for market benefits to allocation holders. But historical processors and processing communities may be harmed if allocation holders choose new markets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the limited entry permit system continue, or is it replaced by a different system based on allocations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The more we move to a system based on allocations, the less clear it is how to interpret regulations based on permits (such as exclusive area registration and permit-holder-on-board requirements) or to determine what privileges are conveyed when a permit transfers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do managers achieve the allocations?</td>
<td>Allocation holders fish consecutively, with managers scheduling fishing opportunities to achieve targets</td>
<td>Consecutive fishing offers opportunities for more allocations to smaller groups—but is harder to enforce and may continue a race for fish.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are allocation holders required to continue to fish the same gear?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>With allocations, there is less reason to restrict how fish are caught.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No</td>
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